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CAP UNDER FIRE. 
THE BUDGETARY REVIEW AND THE CAP  
 






During the process of the budgetary review the CAP faces its greatest challenge of its history: 
not only the (common) financing of the CAP, but the future of the CAP itself is at stake. It is 
obvious that the reform steps implemented so far – even though they have several forward-
looking elements – do not result in a CAP sustainable on the long run. Further changes are 
inevitable.  Basing  our  analysis  on  the  theories  of  fiscal  federalism  and  other  political 
economy approaches, we try to answer the following questions. Is common financing of a 
reformed CAP justified? Can national co-financing be extended? Is it justified to keep the 
system of commonly financed direct payments? 
 
JEL Classification: F15,  F36, H41, H50, Q18,  
 




Future  financing  of the  CAP  is  the  “hottest”  (quoting  the  words  of  Dalia  Grybauskaité 
budgetary commissioner) topic of the budgetary review. The next months will be decisive as 
regards the financing of the CAP beyond 2013. What is more, we can argue that not only the 
financing of the CAP but the future of the CAP itself is at stake.  
 
The common budget and especially its CAP related expenditure has been debated for a long 
time.  The possible cancellation of  financing the Common Agricultural Policy through the 
common budget or a radical reduction – the possibility of „the „found money‟ – piqued interest 
throughout the Union. Net beneficiaries of the CAP and agricultural interest groups on the 
other hand would like to maintain the status quo. Our paper aims to examine objectively this 
sensitive issue. We try to answer: when and how is common financing of the CAP justified. 
 
Fiscal federalism is the most often applied theory in the literature which tries to answer the 
question:  how  the  responsibility  over  policies  and  their  financing  could  optimally  be 
distributed among the EU and the member states. Therefore, when assessing the current CAP 
we apply the theory of fiscal federalism and other political economy aspects.  
 
Common budget and Common Agricultural Policy
2 under debate  
 
CAP and cohesion policy are the main expenditure titles of the common budget. Financing of 
CAP measures is rather particular:  
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–  market support and direct income  payments (first pillar) are fully covered through the 
common budget in accordance with the principle of financial solidarity; 
–  rural  development  (second  pillar)  is  financed  in  accordance  with  the  principle  of 
additionality (co-financing). 
 
CAP reform introduced in 1992 and then further reformed in 2000 and 2003, and modified as 
part of the Health Check has not resulted in the reduction of CAP budget. However, there has 
been a significant change in the structure of the support. Especially the decreasing ratio of 
market support is obvious. At the same time the ratio of direct payments has increased, they 
amount for 70% of the total agricultural support. Their ratio will further increase by 2013. The 
ratio of rural development expenditure has also increased from the mid „90s. Table 1 shows 
the share of agricultural support in the GDP. 
 
Table 1: Share of agricultural support (as % of GDP) 
 
  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
EU15 
1. Common budget
1  0,50  0,49  0,49  0,46  0,46  0,44  0,39 
2. National support  0,15  0,15  0,15  0,12  0,13  0,12  0,09 
3. Total (1+2)  0,65  0,69  0,64  0,58  0,59  0,56  0,48 
EU10 
4. Common budget
1        0,46  0,83  0,86  0,97 
5. National support        0,35  0,35  0,35  0,20 
6. Total (1+2)        0,81  1,18  1,21  1,17 
EU25 
7. Common budget





8. National support        0,13  0,15  0,14  0,09 
9. Total (7+8)        0,59  0,63  0,61  0,52 
Notes: 1) EAGGF expenditure. 2) Total agricultural area (policy area 05).  Authors‟ calculation. 
 
The common budget differs  from the  national budgets. Its primary  function  is to  promote 
common and Community policies, activities and objectives, i.e. it is not a miniature of the 
national budgets for its structure is different. A much higher rate of centralisation compared to 
the competitors is indicated by the data in Table 2. (Note that the high rate of centralisation is 
not the outcome of the common budget amounting to 1.1 per cent of the GDP.) 
 
Table 2: Expenditure of different levels government in certain federal states (% of 
GDP), 2003 
 
  Government 
Federal  State  Local  Total 
Australia  22.2  11.7  1.9  35.8 
Canada  16.8  18.5  5.6  40.9 
Germany  29.4  12.4  6.6  48.3 
Switzerland  16.8  12.2  7.7  36.7 
US  18.7  10.2  7.8  36.7 
EU -15  1.0  34.2  13.5  47.7 
Source: El Agra, 2007 
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The common budget and especially its CAP related expenditure has been debated for various 
reasons
3. Already the budget related disputes  (the mid-term financial perspectives for 2007-
2013) chiefly focused on  the Common Agricultural Policy. Several experts considered the 
CAP related expenditure as money found and the possibility of the „found money‟ piqued 
interest throughout the Union.  
 
In  May 2006, the European Parliament,  the Council and the Commission agreed  that the 
Commission should undertake a fundamental review of the EU budget
4. The budgetary review 
offers an open approach without taboos (a threat for the CAP). Under the consultation process 
of the budget review most of the contributions were very critical as regards the CAP and its 
common financing. There is a widespread consensus t hat further reforms are necessary in 
order to accommodate the agricultural policy to current priorities. Opinions however, differ 
on the extent of the reforms. Most of the contributions stress that European agriculture should 
be competitive internationally and should be able to answer the challenges of climate change, 
food safety and quality requirements. Current expenditure levels and mechanisms are not 
based  on  these  requirements.  Most  of  the  contributions  urge  significant  reduction  of 
agricultural expenditure and radical  reforms especially  as regards the  first pillar. Several 
contributors would like to see the first pillar expenditure moving to the second pillar. There is 
no consensus on the future of direct payments (continue or abolish
5). Although there are clear 
expectations  for  the  reduction  of  agricultural  expenditure,  total  re -nationalization  of  the 
agricultural policy has not been mentioned.  It is evident however, that the CAP can not be 
maintained any more in its current form. The CAP should be placed on an entirely new basis 
in order to make it sustainable (from economic, environmental and social point of view) on 
the long run. 
 
Common financing in the light of fiscal federalism 
 
Fiscal federalism is the most often applied theory in the literature
6 which tries to answer the 
question:  how  the  responsibility  over  policies  and  their  financing  could  optimally  be 
distributed among the EU and the member states.  
 
Fiscal federalism suggests that there are basically three reasons of government interventions: 
stabilization,  equalization  and  allocation  (Musgravian  classification).  Stabilization  refers 
mainly to macroeconomic stability however, it can cover security too. The main function of 
equalization is to manage income inequalities but may extend to risk sharing (insurance) too. 
Allocation function aims to correct  market  failures.  There are  four  major  forms of  market 
                                                 
3 See e.g.: D. Gros: How to Achieve a Better Budget for the European Union. Paper prepared for the Conference 
on  Public  Finances  in  the  EU,  organised  by  the  Bureau  of  European  Policy  Advisers  (BEPA),  European 
Commission, Brussels, 3-4 April 2008.  
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/policy_advisers/conference_docs/gros_bepa_conference_final.pdf 
4 For details of the budgetary review see: http://ec.europa.eu/budget/reform/index_en.htm  
5  According to  the  documents  reviewed  the  cancellation  or  radical  reduction  of  common  financing:  aims  at 
improving  the  position  of  the  net  contributors;  simultaneously  the  thought  of  decreasing  the  cohesion 
expenditure and the common budget arises; agricultural expenditure would decrease (or disappear) only in the 
common  budget  (when  agricultural  policy  is  re-nationalized  and  financial  solidarity  dismissed,  the  poorer 
countries have to face new challenges) 
6 E.g.: W.E. Oates: Fiscal Federalism. Harcourt Brace & Jovanovich, New York, 1972; W. E. Oates: An Essay 
on Fiscal Federalism. Journal of Economic Literature. Vol. 37 (3), 1999, p 1120-49; R.A. Musgrave: Theories of 
fiscal federalism. Public Finance, Vol. 24, 1969, p. 521-532; J. Pelkmans: European Integration – methods and 
economic  analysis.  Longman  Publishing,  New  York,  2006;  G.  Tabellini:  The  Assignment  of  Tasks  in  an 
Evolving  European  Union,  CEPS  Policy  Brief  No.  10,  Centre  for  European  Policy  Studies,  Brussels,  2002 
January   4 
failures which may invoke government intervention: public goods, externalities, economies of 
scale and information asymmetry.  
 
Based on the above criteria a so called intervention test can be made for the EU‟s different 
policy areas, examining whether there is a need for government intervention in a specific area. 
Based on the literature we arrive at the conclusion that common policy is justified only if it 
corrects EU level market failures (with an effect on the whole Union and not only on certain 
member states) or contributes to an explicit EU equalization or stabilization objective.  
 
What is the most efficient level of intervention? 
 
If the intervention test suggests that government intervention is justified in a particular area, 
the next step  is  to decide at what  level  the  intervention would be the  most effective. The 
theory  of  fiscal  federalism  says  that  higher  level  intervention  is  justified  if  it  aims  to 
internalise externalities or to exploit economies of scale. As regards externalities, higher level 
intervention is required in case of cross-border externalities, especially if they have positive 
spill-over  effects.  When  policy  dependent  sunk  costs  are  high,  or  there  are  other  central 
factors which may reduce average costs, centralised policies aimed at exploiting economies of 
scale may have welfare increasing effects.
7  
 
On the other hand, if regional preferences show large heterogeneity as regards the solution of 
a particular problem, decentralised policies should be preferred, because  then policies can be 
differentiated  according to local preferences and conditions.   In addition, according to the 
principle of fiscal equivalence, measures s hould be financed on the same level as they are 
designed, where the beneficiaries and taxpayers are more less the same (Olson, 1969).
8 
 
The trade-off between centralisation and decentralisation  has lead to the  formulation of the 
functional subsidiarity principle. With the help of the so called functional subsidiarity test
9 we 
can determine the ideal level at which decisions should be taken: centralised intervention  is 
necessary only if the member states could not credibly cooperate on a given policy issue. The 
probability of a credible cooperation is especially low in case of imperfect information, when 
the  incentives  to  cheat  are  strong,  when  the  ability  or  willingness  to  impose  collective 
sanctions is perceived as minimal, when efficient provision of public goods should not be 
expected,  Coasian  assumptions  for  efficient  bargaining  (well  defined  property  rights,  no 
transaction costs) seem to be absent in reality, when free-rider effects may be significant.  
 
Political  economics  provide  further  aspects  especially  as  they  explicitly  integrate  self-
interested  governments. Further arguments  for  centralization are: complementary policies, 
corruption, strong lobbying effects and path-dependency (it is difficult to give up a practice 
with deep roots). Decentralisation should be preferred however, if governments pursue their 
own  interests  in contrast to the public  interest. If this  is accompanied by  strong  lobbying 
effects, local preferences can not perfectly be enforced which can result in a welfare loss. 
                                                 
7  For  details  see:  A.  Alesina,  I.  Angeloni,  L.  Schuknecht:  What  Does  the  European  Union  Do?  European 
University Institute Working Paper, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, RSC No. 2002/61 
8 M. Olson, Jr.: The Principle of “Fiscal Equivalence”: The Division of Responsibilities among Different Levels 
of Government. American Economic Review, 1969, Vol. 59, p. 479-487 
9  J.  Pelkmans:  "REACH":  Better  Regulation  for  Europe?  Presentation  for  the  Hearing  of  the  European 
Parliament on REACH, 19 January 2005; J. Pelkmans: European Integration – methods and economic analysis. 
Longman Publishing, New York, 2006; S. Ederveen, J. Pelkmans: Principles of Subsidiarity. CPB Netherlands 
Bureau of Economic Policy, The Hague, 2006 
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Another argument for decentralization is accountability what seems to be easier in case of 
decentralized governments. We should also consider the allocation problem of the community 
resources (common pool). Arguments for centralization and decentralization are summarized 
in Table 3.  
 
Table 3: Level of intervention (political-economic arguments) 
 
CENTRALIZATION  DECENTRALIZATION 
Externalities  Heterogeneous preferences 
Economies of scale  Self-interested government 
Complementary policies  Accountability 
Corruption  Allocation problem of community 
resources (common pool) 
Lobby  Lobby 




If the analyses show that centralization is the most efficient form of the intervention, the next 
question to be answered is: is it justified to finance the intervention from the common budget. 
In  order  to  answer  this  question,  the  policies  in  question  should  be  confronted  with  the 
(common) budgetary principles: subsidiarity, proportionality, additionality, value for money, 
enhancement of the provision of public goods and value added (at European level). (See Table 
4) 
 
Table 4: Level of intervention (budgetary principles)  
 
(COMMON) BUDGETARY PRINCIPLES 
Subsidiarity  EU intervention only if it is the optimal 
solution 
Proportionality  Intervention should be proportional to that 
required by the objective  
Additionality  EU financing can not substitute national 
resources  
Value for money  Cost-effective intervention 
European public goods  Enhancement of the provision of public 
goods 
Value added (at European level)  Income of the benefiting region should be 




Methods of intervention 
 
Literature suggests basically four methods to address the allocation problems: 
–  Rules, regulations and directives (legal approach with administrative measures). This 
is the most cost-effective method, however, its applicability is limited. They are used 
mainly in case of negative externalities and information asymmetries.   6 
–  Coase-like  solutions  (legal-economics  approach):  assigning  property  rights  and 
creating (transparent)  markets. (Private bargaining will lead to the internalisation of 
externalities.)  
–  (Semi)governmental production. Actual provision  of certain public  goods  may take 
place by private firms (semi-governmental production), since this may be more cost-
efficient.  
–  (Pigouvian type) subsidies or taxes (welfare approach) can be applied for externalities. 
Limits of  this solution are the  following:  marginal  utility  has  to be  measured, the 
subsidy can not exceed marginal cost and the subsidy has to be financed.  
 
Income and risk  inequity problems can be addressed  by taxation,  subsidization,  insurance 
systems and state guarantee. The choice among policy measures should be based on a cost-
benefit analysis.  
 
Is common financing of the CAP justified? 
 
In this section theoretical categories are confronted with the reality of the CAP, applying a 




As regards the agricultural policy, allocation and equity functions of the interventions can be 
stressed. Table 5 shows the most important allocation and equity functions of the agricultural 
policy. 
 
Table 5: Allocation and equity functions in the agricultural policy 
 
ALLOCATION   
Public goods  Protection and preservation of natural 
resources etc. (see Table 7)  Externalities 
Economies of scale  Interregional direct payments 
Imperfect or asymmetric information  Crisis and risk management, food safety 
EQUITY   
Income 
Risk 
Regional convergence, above average 
(sectoral, systematic) risk, income disparities  
 
The allocation function aims to correct market failures.  Agriculture is a special area of the 




As Table 6 shows, the agriculture, and in a wider sense, the rural areas can provide a wide 
range of public goods and of (positive and negative) externalities. Several problems may arise 
however, as regards the evaluation of these public goods and externalities.  
 
Table 6: Certain public goods provided by agriculture 
 




Protection and preservation of natural 
resources 
Stable ecosystem 
Local, regional, European 
Regional, European, global 
Local, regional, European, global   7 
Biological diversity 
Protection of valuable natural areas  
Carbon sequestration  
Waste management 
Local, regional, European 
European, global 





Local, regional, European 
Local, regional, European, global 
Socially sustainable 
agriculture 
Buffer function on the labour market 
Cultural diversity – maintenance of 
material and non-material cultural 
heritage 
Contribution to the catching up of rural 
areas 
Local, regional, European 
Local, regional, European, global 
 
 
Local, regional, European 
 
Land management  Stable ecosystem 
Biological diversity 
Carbon sequestration 
Water management +flood management 
(integrated approach - agriculture as a 
cause and a solution to flooding) 
Regional, European, global 
Local, regional, European, global 
European, global 










Reduction of greenhouse gas 
Carbon sequestration 
Local, regional, European, global 
Regional, European, global 
Local, regional, European, global 





Carbon sequestration  
Watershed protection  
Biodiversity conservation in drylands 
European, global  
Regional, European, global 





Carbon sequestration  
Regional, European, global 
Local, regional, European 
European, global  
Source: Authors‟ compilation based mainly on FAO, 2002 and 2007  
 
Most of the public goods involve some kind of stock feature
10 (stocks of pollution, stocks of 
knowledge, biological or genetic stocks etc.). By their nature, stocks accumulate, often very 
slowly, so that it may be difficult to recognize the symptoms of the disease until it is too late 
to cure. Moreover, because stocks accumulate slowly, stock externalities often have long -
lasting consequences and are irreversible or near -irreversible. One of the major difficulties 
with managing public goods (that have stock features) is that they impose costs on the current 
generation while the benefits may come far in the future. From a political point of view, this 
implies that any bargain is a negative sum game (i.e.: there is no Pareto-improving solution) 
for the current generation.  
 
In sum, we can arrive at the conclusion that the level of agricultural public goods  without 
support would fall behind  the socially optimal level. At the same time,  the current level of 
support is disproportionally high (from public goods point of view).  Moreover, the current 
support system is insufficiently targeted.  
 
Economies of scale  
 
In case of certain public goods – according to the OECD (2007) – there may be economies of 
scale that necessitate provision by large jurisdictions (central government), since  it may be 
impossible to create the right incentives for efficient decentralized provision. E.g. Grethe 
                                                 
10 For details see W. D. Nordhaus: Global Public Goods and the Problem of Global Warming. Annual Lecture, 
The Institut d'Economie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, France, June 14, 1999.   8 
(2006)
11  states  that  preservation  of  cross  border  wildlif e  habitats  is  a  typical  case  for 
economies of scale.  
 
Scale  economies  may  arise  also  from  the  inter -regional  nature  of  the  re -distributive 
programmes (e.g.: direct payments).  This  stems  from  the  fact that  the EU  level  has the 
institutional  (organizational)  capacity  to  govern  and  monitor  such   inter-regional 
(re)distributive projects (Molle, 2007)
12. Furthermore,  when the (income) support system is 
executed by Member States, this could distort competition and may have a negative effect on 
the functioning of the Internal Market.  
 
Imperfect or asymmetric information 
 
As  it  is  known,  agricultural  activity  is  accompanied  with  higher  average  risk  (weather, 
diseases etc.) than that of other branches of the economy. Risks higher than average (which 
are  in  general  systematic)  necessitate  state/Community  level  intervention.  In  this  respect, 
there  are  two  possible  ways  of  Community  level  intervention.  On  the  one  hand  public 
intervention should encourage training on the field of market-oriented risk management tools 
of which use is still very limited. On the other hand, subsidies are needed to counterbalance 
the fact that, due to the extremely high systematic risk that is typical in the agricultural sector, 
insurance companies only undertake insurance against an excessively high premium. Because 
of the above average risks producers can not remain without protection: economic crises must 
be managed at Community level.  
 
Food safety is a credence function which can hardly be perceived by consumers. Market itself 
can  often  not  provide  the  socially  optimal  food  safety  level,  and  this  calls  for  public 
intervention. The literature of the economics of food safety distinguishes four factors, which 
as a source of market imperfections can evoke public intervention: asymmetric information on 
risk; food safety as public good; taking into account social costs and benefits; when there is a 




Economic and social strengthening of rural areas forms an integral part of economic growth. 
Interventions  aimed  at  regional  convergence  (interregional  re-distributive  policies)  could 
therefore be justified (Ferrer, 2007)
13. On equity grounds e.g., even the most radical authors 
recognise a justification for direct payments, although, th ey do it from a perspective of path 
dependency. Before implementing a support system, cost-benefit analyses should be carried 
out. The current income support system of the CAP (price support, direct payments etc.) has 
not been based on these kinds of analyses, and therefore it is not surprising that transfer 
efficiency of these payments is relatively low. The current support system favours the owners 
of production factors and production entitlements instead of the needy. (Full decoupling and 
targeted policies could prevent doing this.) 
 
                                                 
11 H. Grethe: Environmental and Agricultural Policy: What Roles for the EU and the Member States? Keynote 
paper for the conference Subsidiarity and Economic Reform in Europe, organized by the European Commission, 
the  CPB  Netherlands  Bureau  for  Economic  Policy  Analysis  and  the  Dutch  Ministry  of  Economic  Affairs, 
November 8-9, 2006, Brussels 
12 W. Molle: European Cohesion Policy, Routledge, London, 2007 
13 N. J.  Ferrer: The  EU  Budget: The UK  Rebate and the CAP Phasing them both out? Centre for  European 
Policy Studies, CEPS Task Force Report, Brussels, December 2007   9 
Level of agricultural and rural intervention 
 
Theory  suggests  that  only  the  management  of  public  goods  based  support  systems  and 
externalities  with  significant  spill-over  effects  can  be  justified  at  central  level.  These 
objectives however, may have important regional (spatial) and benefit dimensions. Focusing 
on  the  spatial  and  benefit  dimensions  of  public  goods  has  the  advantage  of  making  the 
principle of subsidiarity applicable: community  level  intervention (centralization)  may be 
justified in the following cases:  
  regional  (European)  and  global  public  goods  (because  of  self-interested 
governments);
14 
  vertical cooperation in case of core activities (e.g.: research)
15; 
  economies of scale; 
  risk reduction and direct utility (their benefits can usually be enjoyed in a wider range 
than that of capacity enhancing activities)
16; 
  joint production. 
 
We can speak about joint production if the production of two or more outputs is interlinked in 
some way (e.g.: through technical interdependencies or non-allocable inputs). For agricultural 
public goods, jointness is mainly related to the existence of non-allocable inputs, where it is 
difficult to determine a non-allocable input‟s contribution to each output. In agriculture, land 
is  the  most  obvious  non-allocable  input  since  land  enters  into  the  production  of  both 
landscape preservation and food security, as well as agricultural products
17.  
 
The enlarged Union shows  significant differences as regards  income, population density, 
climate, land quality etc. It is not surprising therefore, that preferences for the objectives to be 
supported are rather heterogeneous too. The strongly heterogeneous preferences take us in the 
direction of decentralization.  
 
Instruments available  
 
Instruments of public intervention and their possible implementation areas (having regard to 
the aspects discussed earlier) are shown in Table 7.  
 
Table 7: Instruments of public intervention available for the agricultural policy 
 
  Area of implementation 
Rules, regulations, directives  Negative externalities, standards 
Coase-type solutions  Certain environmental issues 
(Semi)governmental production  Crisis and risk management 
Pigou-type subsidies or taxes  Public goods, multifunctionality, positive 
                                                 
14 For details see: OECD: Financing Global and Regional Public Goods Through ODA: Analysis and Evidence 
from the OECD Creditor Reporting System. Working Paper No. 232, 2004 www.oecd.org 
15 For details see: O. Morrissey, D. Velde, A. Hewitt: Defining International Public Goods: Conceptual Issues. 
In:  M.  Ferroni  and  A.  Mody  (eds)  International  Public  Goods:  Incentives,  Measurements  and  Financing. 
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002 
16 For details see: Morrissey et al. (2002). 
17  R.  J.  Brunstad,  I.  Gaasland,  E.  Vardal:  Optimal  provision  of  public  goods.  Implications  for  support  to 
agriculture. Discussion paper, INSTITUTT FOR SAMFUNNSØKONOMI DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, 
2007. They concluded that joint production of public goods (landscape and food security in their case) require 
less support than separate production.   10 
externalities 
 
The current system is based on regulations and support measures. When selecting the most 
efficient  instruments  social,  environmental  and  economic  aspects  have  to  be  taken  into 
account. Here we  have to stress  the  importance of proportionality,  what can be seen as a 
social cost benefit analysis that examines what policy measure to use.  
 
Agricultural policy in the light of budgetary principles 
 
This section examines how the current CAP meets the budgetary principles and what kind of 




When examining the spending side of the EU budget, the study of the Ecorys et al. (2008)
18 
made the subusidiarity test for the CAP in an enlarged form. They took into account not only 
the three most important relevant criteria of fiscal federalism, but also political economy and 
public choice aspects. Their main conclusions are the following: 
–  Path dependency seems to be the main argument for the current existence of direct 
payments and market interventions.  
–  As price support and coupled payments distort markets, they have clear externalities. 
Therefore, there is a case for centralising the implementation of market interventions, 
although this remains a second-best option. (The first best solution would be to abolish 
them altogether.) 





Without support, the levels of rural public goods would fall short of the socially optimal level. 
However, we can state  that  the current support level is well above the level that can be 
defended by the public goods argument.  
 
The origins of this problem go back to the objectives of the CAP set out in the Amsterdam 
Treaty (modernization,  income security,  market  stabilization and  food  security). Although 
these agricultural policy objectives  have remained  important, there  has been a significant 
change in emphasis. In recent years objectives related to the environment, rural development 
and  food  safety  (or  in  generally: provision of public  goods)  have also become  important. 
These latter objectives have important spatial and/or benefit dimensions, therefore, in their 
cases traditional broad-based policies do not necessarily address current societal interests, and 
are often wasteful and inefficient
19.  
 
                                                 
18  ECORYS  Nederland  BV,  Netherlands  Bureau  for  Economic  Policy  Analysis,  Institute  for  Economic 
Research:  Study  on  EU  spending.  Final  Report,  Nederland  BV  Rotterdam,  2008. 
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/reform/library/issue_paper/study_EUspending_en.pdf  
19 For details see e.g.: OECD: A  matrix approach to evaluating policy: preliminary  findings from  PEM pilot 
studies of Crop policy in the EU, the US, Canada and Mexico, COM/AGR/CA/TD/TC(99)117/FINAL; OECD: 
Improving the environmental performance of agriculture: Policy options and market approaches, OECD, Paris , 
2001b; OECD: Income transfer efficiency of farm support measures. [AGR/CA/APM(2001)24], 2001d.   11 
An OECD study
20 concludes that in case of policies which aim  to correct  market failures 
(e.g.: landscape preservation or biodiversity) targeted support (being it decoupled or not) may 
prove to be the most cost efficient solution (especially if the savings through targeting are 
high). The study mentions also the exceptions:  widespread market failure, which limits the 
savings from targeting; high policy-related transaction costs; decoupled measure where there 
are high  costs of separating the production of commodities  from  that of  non-commodities 
(joint production). 
 
Value for money 
 
This is perhaps, the most complex area of the analysis. The aim of intervention is generally to 
correct market failures (public goods, externalities, asymmetric information etc.) because the 
market of a particular “product” does not function well or there is no market at all. Therefore, 
it  is  difficult  to  calculate  the  market  value.  There  are  several  other  factors  which  make 
calculation more difficult. E.g.: there are different types of values (user, option, existence and 
bequest)  and  there  is  no  uniquely  approved  measurement  method.  The  most  commonly 
applied methods (mainly for environmental services) are the following: contingent valuation, 
travel  cost  and  hedonic  price  method.  Calculation  of  value  on  this  area  requires  further 
research.  
 
European value added 
 
It is highly debated that the Common Agricultural Policy generates value added for Europe. 
Ecorys et al. (2008) argues, that presently, the support measures of the Common Agricultural 
Policy score badly in terms of EU value added due to a lack of efficient targeting and ensuing 
excessive opportunity costs. According to the definition by Sapir (2004)
21 of (European) value 
added, the CAP would have to be abolished and completely renationalised.  
European public goods 
In addition to production, agriculture provides extra services  to the society,  the  European 
agricultural model is typically characterised by multifunctionality
22. The key elements of this 
multifunctionality are as follows: 
–  multiple  product  and  non-product  output  produced  jointly  in  the  agriculture  (joint 
output) 
–  creating non-product output with characteristics of externalities or public goods. 
 
All  of  these  (maintaining  the  landscape  and  viable  rural  communities,  providing 
environmental and ethical  goods etc.)  can be  jointly classified as  European public goods 
(Table 6). These accomplishments add to the quality of life in the EU member states while, at 
the same time (because of the additional costs  involved)  are considered to be competitive 
disadvantages compared to the overseas competitors.  
 
The above mentioned multifunctional elements serve essential, cross-border externalities and 
provide significant European and global public goods. It is a common interest that even in 
                                                 
20 OECD: Policy design characteristics for effective targeting. AGR/CA/APM(2005)32/FINAL, 2007 
21 A. Sapir, P. Aghion, G. Bertola, M. Hellwig, J. Pisani-Ferry, D. K. Rosati,  J. Vinals, H. Wallace, M. Buti, M. 
Nava: An Agenda for a Growing Europe: The Sapir Report. Oxford University Press, 2004 
22 One has to bear in mind that the term multifunctionality in this economic concept has another meaning than 
the term multifunctionality as it is often used by agricultural interest groups in defence of the status quo.    12 
poorer member states and regions, landscapes correspond to the requirements of the European 
model. Furthermore, common  financing avoids the distorting effects of possibly different 
national  support  systems  on  the  internal  market  and  on  competitiveness.  It  must  be 
emphasised however, that the magnitude of current CAP subsidies has not been determined 
based on the proper assessment of the above functions. The size of agricultural subsidies in 
the EU essentially depends on historic amounts. Accordingly, the scale of these agricultural 
subsidies is debatable. 
 
The multifunctional factors result in economic policy action, if there is no private market for 
certain welfare increasing or decreasing joint outputs. If there is a need for political action in 
such cases for the internalisation of externalities, the characteristics of the affected activity 
will have an impact on planning and the application of the corrective measures. 
 
In case of the joint production of private and public goods efficiency will require that private 
goods are produced, used and traded governed by market mechanisms. In addition, for the 
production of public goods required by the society targeted and decoupled economic policy 
measures are necessary. The eventual goal is to establish principles of good policy practice 
“that permit  the achievement  of  multiple  food  and  non-food objectives  in the  most cost-
effective manner, taking into account the direct and indirect costs of international spill-over 
effects.” (OECD, 2001d) 
 
Questions to be answered during the process of the Budgetary Review 
 
Here we try to answer some sensitive questions, which should be answered during the process 
of the Budgetary Review.  
 
Is common financing of a reformed CAP justified? 
 
Negative  CAP  positions  are  usually  based  on  the  assessment  of  European  value  added. 
However, they do not take into account the value of public goods provided by the rural areas. 
As we  have already  mentioned,  it  is  very difficult to calculate the  value of public  goods. 
However,  this  does  not  mean  that  they  should  completely  be  disregarded  during  the 
calculation  of  value  added.  It  is  commonly  approved  that  they  contribute  to 
local/regional/national/EU/global welfare, but their value is not added to the GDP.  
 
Growth should be measured with an extended form of the GDP: including also the value of 
public goods. What is more, we should also take into account the intergenerational nature of 
certain public goods. Further problem may arise from the fact that the value of certain public 
goods do not directly appear in the agricultural sector. Biodiversity, landscape and several 
other benefits of rural public goods favours directly the tourism.  
 
We argue that the challenges Europe faces require EU level agricultural and rural policies. 
Regulation may help in certain cases, while in other cases financial resources are required to 
correct  market  failures.  Regulation and financial frameworks should be developed at EU 
level, because: 
–  Europe is one of the largest food producing regions of the world. From the perspective 
of  global  food  security  it  is  essential  to  keep  production  factors  in  a  “stand-by” 
position, to improve competitiveness and to enhance innovation. 
–  Land  is  a  strategic  input.  Agriculture  and  forestry  utilises  more  than  80%  of  the 
European  land surface. Food production  is only one of the  several services of the   13 
ecosystem. Perfect competition (without intervention) would push the other (welfare) 
services (competing for land as an input) into the background, as they have no or only 
limited market.  
–  Management of regional and global environmental problems (e.g.: climate change) is 
justified at EU level. Climate change is one of the most important priorities of the EU. 
Hardly  exists  another  sector  which  is  more  affected  by  climate  change  than 
agriculture. Agriculture has not only to accommodate to climate change, but it can also 
combat against it (alternative energy, carbon sequestration etc.).  
–  Quality and management of the nature, the environment and the landscape requires 
cross-border approach, as neither the ecosystem, nor the environment and pollution 
respects national borders. 
–  Ethical  aspects  (e.g.:  animal  welfare)  and  (human,  plant  and  animal)  health 
requirements make supranational approach necessary from trade perspective.  
–  Sustainable development is a European interest and in a way not to pass the burden on 
the environment, on developing countries or on future generations.  
–  From the perspective of competition policy it is important that at least the European 
competition be fair. (E.g.: binding ecological efficiency should not weaken economic 
efficiency  –  only  richer  member  states  could  afford  support  based  on  ecological 
reasons.)  
 
Certain level of common budgetary contribution seems to be justified in the above mention 
cases (even if it is  made in a co-financed form). However, current level of support is well 
above  the  level  justified by public  goods. The policy  should be reformed along the basic 
principles of public expenditure (see Table 8), efficiency should be improved through targeted 
policies (principle of value added) and alternative costs should be minimised.  
 
Table 8: Basic elements of a reform reflecting the budgetary principles 
 
(COMMON) BUDGETARY PRINCIPLES 
Subsidiarity  Rising level of decentralization 
Proportionality  Targeted policies, cost-benefit analysis, 
project-like approach  
Additionality  Co-financing, except for flat rate payments 
for joint products  
Value for money  + Calculating value of non product outputs 
European public goods  Support system based on public goods 
Value added (at European level)  Targeted support, positive externalities with 




Can national co-financing be extended?  
 
Based on the theories (fiscal federalism, political economics) we argue that full centralization 
–  common  financing,  implementation  and  monitoring)  is  justified  only  in  case  of  joint 
products  (see  Figure  1).  In  all  other  cases  certain  level  of  decentralization  should  be 
considered: national and regional authorities should take more financial liability
23.  
                                                 
23  For  simulation  results  see  e.g.:  F.  Heinemann,  P.  Mohl,  S.  Osterloh:  Reform  Options  for  the  EU  Own 
Resources System. Springer, 2008 p178 (pp 74-78)   14 
 




Is it justified to keep the system of commonly financed direct payments? 
 
Direct payments were originally  introduced  in compensation  for the  income  loss suffered 
because of the reduction of price support. Originally they were coupled to the production and 
distorted the markets so they clearly had (negative) externalities. These externalities justified 
the  centralization  of  the  policy  and  the  financing.  Nowadays,  most  of  the  payments  are 
decoupled, they have no, or at most minimal distorting effects. Fiscal federalism suggests that 
direct payments should totally be abolished. However, path dependency encourages us to find 
a second best solution. Also the former reforms show that the necessary changes can only be 
made gradually.  As a  first step,  it is necessary to reduce the rate of general support and 
increase the level of targeted payments.  
 
Changing the “content” or base of the payments is a more complex process and requires more 
time (see Figure 2). Income support can not be a central task. Neither economies of scale, nor 
internalisation of externalities justify central financing.  
 
Figure 2: Reasons of common financing in the old and in the new system 
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Based on the theories we can again argue that full centralization  is justified only in case of 
joint products (see Figure 3). This suggests that flat rate payments can be made if the non 
product  output  is  a  joint  product  of  the  agricultural  activity,  for  public  goods  of  which 
provision can be expected from all European producers, and of which value is more or less 
independent of the location of production.  
 





It  is  important  to  stress,  that  even  if  economies  of  scale  justify  central  financing  of  the 
provision  of  public  goods,  other  functions  can  effectively  be  accomplished  at  lower 
governmental  levels,  depending  on  the  nature  of  spill-over  effects.  In  these  cases 
decentralization should be considered.  
 
Public goods may show significant regional differences. These differences (specific social and 
environmental conditions of the member states) justify the regional supplementary payments 
aiming at enhancing targeted provision of public goods. Targeted regional payments could 
ensure that support adjusts better to the actual additional costs (proportionality) and contribute 
to a more balanced cost-benefit ratio (cost efficiency, value for money).  